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Improved Food Inspection Model
Final Model

7. Compliance and enforcement

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Introduction

The model proposes to apply a single, consistent compliance and enforcement strategy across all food commodities. This strategy would be based on the principle that industry is responsible for producing safe food that complies with regulatory requirements. When non-compliance is found, industry would be responsible for taking appropriate action to correct the situation. The model aims to make compliance and enforcement transparent and appropriate to the level of non-compliance.

Compliance promotion complements rather than diminishes the CFIA's ability to take enforcement action, when necessary.

The processes that lead to inspection decisions–or compliance and enforcement actions–must be objective, impartial and equitable. They must be in keeping with the CFIA's values and ethics and respect the regulated party's rights.

For more information, see the Compliance and Enforcement Operational Policy.

As the food regulatory framework is modernized, this policy will be reviewed and updated, as required.

7.1 CFIA response when non-compliance is detected

The inspector would respond to non-compliance. Specific responses could be directed at the food commodity (for example, seizure and detention of product) and/or the regulated party (for example, issue a corrective action request). The inspector would have the flexibility to select the appropriate response based on the gravity of the non-compliance, considering factors such as the potential or actual harm to public health, the compliance history of the regulated party and the intent.

The appropriate level, type and extent of response would depend on a range of factors, including:

  • the potential for harm to public health, such as:
    • the degree to which non-compliance has impacted or has the potential to impact food safety, public health or consumer protection
    • the magnitude of the non-compliance (critical, serious, technical)
    • whether the food commodity is within the regulated party's control
  • the intent of the regulated party, including:
    • whether non-compliance was intentional, accidental or negligent
    • the extent to which the regulated party had exercised due diligence
  • the regulated party's demonstrated performance, including:
    • its compliance history
    • the history of complaints
    • the level of commitment by management

When dealing with imports, the CFIA might require importers to provide documentation or information to demonstrate that the food commodity is compliant with the legislation. An importer who has a history of importing non-compliant food commodities may be required to submit evidence of compliance before the CFIA would give permission to import a food commodity. For example, an importer could be required to provide the CFIA with documentation from an accredited laboratory or other documented evidence of analytical results demonstrating compliance for five consecutive shipments following the non-compliant importation.

7.2 Compliance and enforcement actions

The CFIA recognizes that, for many regulated parties, the transition to the improved food inspection model would require time to

  • document a preventive control plan,
  • apply for a licence,
  • make changes to their practices, and
  • adapt to the risk-based approach described in the model.

Technical and educational outreach will be performed as part of the CFIA's Compliance Promotion Strategy

The CFIA recognizes that many regulated parties' business models would need to evolve. As part of its compliance promotion strategy, the CFIA intends to provide technical and educational outreach in a variety of formats. The intention is to make it easy for regulated parties to gather information and interact with the CFIA online and in person (for example, an online labelling tool, generic model systems). Transitional enforcement guidelines would also be used in the initial stages of implementing the model and proposed food regulations.

If there is critical or serious non-compliance, the affected food commodity would be controlled and the non-compliance would be addressed to prevent recurrence. At the end of the transition period, the CFIA would use its single compliance and enforcement strategy to respond to the non-compliance and would take action by using any of the tools found in Annex D.

Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs), enabled by the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties (AAAMP) Act are an important element of a modern enforcement and inspection regime and offer specific benefits.

  • AMPs allow for alternative actions to be taken to help ensure compliance with requirements, without having to immediately resort to the suspending or cancelling licences or to instituting proceedings;
  • AMPs provide an avenue other than the penalties section of an Act for encouraging compliance with requirements;
  • AMPs allow for regulated parties to request a review of the facts by the Canada Agricultural Review Tribunal; and
  • AMPs can take the form of either a notice of violation with a warning, or a notice of violation with a penalty determined in accordance with the AAAMP Act.

Under the SFCA, the CFIA will have the authority to adopt AMPs as an enforcement tool for food commodities.

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