3. Authorities and Principles of Control

3.1 Purpose

Canada's primary policy for NAI in domestic poultry is stamping out, including the possible use of pre-emptive slaughter to stop the outbreak and possible secondary outbreaks, as well as to prevent related economic and genetic losses, and zoonotic risk.

3.2 Authority

The statutory authority for the control of NAI is contained in the Health of Animals Act (1990 c. 21).

3.3 Statement

The CFIA is committed to safeguarding food, animals, and plants, which enhances the health and well-being of Canada's people, the environment and the economy. To achieve this, the CFIA has developed a control policy regarding NAI based on stamping out. It may use emergency vaccination under certain outbreak consideration factors, geographic situations, and management practices. This would serve as an addition to stamping out and pre-emptive slaughter, strengthening the effort to temporarily control virus spread until stamping out can eliminate the presence of NAI virus in domestic poultry. The CFIA may envision a modified stamping-out policy for LPNAI infections in specific sectors of the poultry industry, once better biosecurity infrastructure and understanding of NAI prevalence in domestic poultry have been achieved through active surveillance activities.

3.4 Principles of Control in Poultry

3.4.1 Notifiable Avian Influenza Case Definition

3.4.1.1 Canadian Food Inspection Agency Definition

In an international poultry disease control context, NAI viruses are defined by the OIE, whose definitions have been adopted by the CFIA, as follows:

NAI is an infection of poultry caused by any Influenza Type A virus of the H5 or H7 subtypes, or by any AI virus with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2 or killing at least 75% of the inoculated chickens. NAI viruses can be divided into highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza (HPNAI) viruses and low pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI) viruses.

HPNAI viruses have an IVPI in six-week-old chickens greater than 1.2 or, as an alternative, cause at least 75% mortality in four- to eight-week-old chickens infected intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses that do not have an IVPI greater than 1.2, or that cause less than 75% mortality in an intravenous lethality test, should be sequenced to determine whether multiple basic amino acids are present at the cleavage site of the HA. If the amino acid motif is similar to that observed for other tested HPNAI viruses, the isolate should be considered to be HPNAI.

LPNAI viruses are all influenza viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes that are not HPNAI. Currently, HPAI and LPAI subtypes, H5 and H7 are reportable under the Health of Animals Act (Reportable Diseases List) and commonly called NAI.

The minimum criteria for identifying NAI-infected flocks is detecting H5 or H7 subtypes, as determined by RRT-PCR, though the disease control activities related to the case definition may evolve in the course of an outbreak.

3.4.1.2 Suspect Case

A suspect case of NAI is defined by the following:

  • clinical signs or post-mortem lesions confirmed to be compatible with AI by a private practitioner, owner, pathologist, or the veterinarian in charge (VIC), in collaboration with the Area FAD program officer;

or

  • a non-negative result to detection of H5 or H7 antibodies from serological samples.

3.4.1.3 Presumptive Case

A presumptive case of NAI is defined as follows:

  • a non-negative result to NAI-subtype-specific RRT-PCR (H5 or H7) from an AI-NL;

or

  • one of the suspect criteria described in section 3.4.1.2 is met, in addition to at least two of the following criteria:
    • significant epidemiological contact with a known infected premises;
    • high mortality;
    • non-negative result to the detection of Influenza Type A virus (RRT-PCR test); and
    • a non-negative result to NAI-subtype-specific antibodies (H5 or H7) with the HI test.

3.4.1.4 Confirmed Case

A confirmed case of NAI is defined by:

  • Isolation of the Influenza Type A virus using samples collected by CFIA staff during the course of their initial investigation;

and

  • its identification as an H5 or H7 subtype (NAI);

or

  • a subsequent determination of its pathogenicity by NCFAD as highly pathogenic, or both.

In circumstances wherein the virus cannot be isolated, infection with a NAI virus can be confirmed by combining other diagnostic tools, if the investigation is associated with a clinical history. This approach will be assessed by NCFAD, in consultation with epidemiologists and field evidence, on a case-by-case basis.

3.4.2 Principles of Control

All cases of H5 and H7 are reported to the CFIA for further characterization, regardless of apparent pathogenicity. All cases of highly pathogenic forms of the virus are reportable to the CFIA. In most situations, Canada's stamping-out policy applies.

The larger objectives of an effective stamping-out initiative are as follows:

  • to rapidly identify all exposed premises;
  • to apply strict movement control;
  • to trace and destroy all infected or potentially infected animals, products, and materials;
  • to clean and disinfect infected premises and vehicles to avoid further spread; and
  • to regain Canada's NAI country freedom status without delay.

This policy is only sustainable where available resources can eliminate infected birds faster than the disease is spreading. If stamping out is impractical, long-term control options (e.g. vaccination) will be discussed with industry. If the disease were to become endemic, infected poultry would be slaughtered at industry cost and individual flock certification of freedom would be implemented. All economic factors must be considered in the decision to abandon the stamping-out policy.

3.4.3 Biocontainment

The CFIA is responsible for eradicating outbreaks of NAI in flocks. CFIA personnel or any other people who must enter premises that are declared infected must follow established biocontainment rules to prevent the virus from spreading beyond these premises. Anyone requiring entry to infected premises must demonstrate their biocontainment competencies before being authorized to work in a contaminated environment.

In addition to full compliance with the established protocols, the following rules apply:

  • wearing PPE,
  • decontaminating objects that must be removed from the infected premises;
  • taking a shower in situations in which the level of exposure to the infectious material is deemed to be high; and
  • having no contact with other susceptible species for at least 48 hours following entry to the infected premises.

The biocontainment and biosecurity unit is responsible for ensuring that these rules are followed during the control and response operations (i.e. destruction, disposal, cleaning, and decontamination). A biocontainment and biosecurity coordinator is assigned to the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), and biocontainment and biosecurity officers are assigned to each of the infected premises from the start of operations to their cessation. Biocontainment and biosecurity officers are also responsible for implementing an internal audit system regarding the compliance of personnel and the implementation of biocontainment and biosecurity measures in the Primary Control Zone (PCZ).

3.4.4 Commercial and Non-Commercial Flocks

The role of non-commercial flocks in the spread of NAI must be defined in consideration of species susceptibility, the size of the flocks, location, and the degree of interaction between this sector and the commercial poultry industry in all Canadian provinces.

The OIE does not define non-commercial flocks; however, its definition of poultry clearly includes both commercial and non-commercial operations:

All domesticated birds, including backyard poultry, used for the production of meat or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for re-stocking of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose.

Based on the husbandry characteristics of non-commercial flocks and the unlikely contact between non-commercial and commercial flocks, the commercial poultry sector must adopt and employ mandatory auditable and verifiable standards that ensure effective barriers among commercial, non-commercial, and wild bird populations. The CFIA is presently partnering with industry in developing a biosecurity structure, including an audit process, for the poultry industry. With a biosecurity structure in place, one could characterize non-commercial operations as a population that, if infected, would not pose a risk to the commercial poultry sector.

There is still work to be done to better characterize the non-commercial poultry sector in Canada. In the interim, the CFIA, in accordance with the Poultry Expert Committee, has defined commercial and non-commercial poultry as follows:

Non-commercial poultry

Poultry raised on a premises with fewer than 300 domestic birds that are kept as pets, including show birds and rare breeds, or raised for the owner's consumption and use only.

Commercial poultry

  • Poultry raised under Canada's supply management (quota) system or for the purpose of selling their products and by-products for financial gain outside the quota system.
  • Poultry raised on a premises with 300 or more domestic birds, even if there are no commercial activities.

3.4.5 Risk Assessment

The CFIA's disease response follows a risk-based approach. Priority is given to operations that pose the greatest risk of disease spread or amplification. Recent experience, both internationally and domestically, has shown that non-commercial flocks are not a significant factor in the spread of the AI virus. An assessment grid including factors such as affected species, distance from a known infected premises, management practices, and many other epidemiological elements can assist in estimating the risk of a particular flock becoming infected by AI and in determining the risk of that flock spreading the disease.

3.4.6 Risk Management

As biosecurity and biocontainment measures in the non-commercial sector are not well established, any non-commercial poultry flock infected with the H5 or H7 AI subtype, regardless of the pathogenicity, must be considered at risk of transmitting the AI virus to commercial or other non-commercial flocks. If Galliformes are exposed to these viruses, the possibility exists that the virus may adapt, eventually mutate, and develop increased pathogenicity.

Any poultry flock infected with HPAI, as well as any significant contact flock that becomes infected, should be destroyed.

In a non-commercial flock infected with LPNAI (H5 or H7) in a remote location and not surrounded by premises with susceptible species, depending on the ability to effectively manage the opportunity for virus spread (including wild bird contact), it may be possible to quarantine and allow the infection to burn out rather than destroy the flock. These decisions may also depend on the genetic value or uniqueness of the flock and the need for support by CFIA's legal services.

3.4.7 Zoning for Notifiable Avian Influenza

3.4.7.1 Zoning Before the Declaration of a Primary Control Zone

Before the Declaration of a PCZ (if appropriate) by the Minister, a zone may be considered around known infected premises:

Initial Infected Zone - For NAI, a minimum 1-km radius and up to 3 km surrounding an infected premises is considered an Infected Zone. The delineation of the area may vary depending on physical and geographic boundaries, the apparent progression of the outbreak, the density of poultry population, and poultry production types (commercial and non-commercial).

3.4.7.2 Zoning After the Declaration of a Primary Control Zone

Following the Declaration of a PCZ (if appropriate) by the Minister, the disease control zones will be established as follows:

  1. Infected Zone – A zone or zones established pursuant to the Health of Animals Regulations, which include all the NAI-positive premises. The outer boundary of an Infected Zone is at least 1 km and up to 3 km from any known infected premises. The delineation of the area may vary, depending on physical and geographic boundaries, and according to the progression of the outbreak.
  2. Restricted Zone – A zone established immediately surrounding the Infected Zone, and measured based on the epidemiology of the disease under consideration in order to prevent the spread of the causative animal pathogen. The outer boundary of this zone will be at least 10 km from any known infected premises.
  3. Security Zone – The geographic area between the perimeter of the Restricted Zone and the edge of the PCZ. This zone is controlled and referred to as a Security Zone to prevent confusion when the rest of the country is referred to as "Free."

A Secondary Control Zone (SCZ) may be declared by the minister as a buffer around the PCZ or to prevent introduction of a disease into Canada.

3.4.8 Guidelines for Control in Non-Avian Species

AI viruses are closely related to influenza Type A viruses found in humans, horses, pigs, dogs, and others species. Ordinarily, the influenza viruses found in each species infect only that species, but occasionally, a virus from one species may infect another species. There are two ways in which this may happen:

First, if two viruses from different species infect a cell simultaneously, the gene segments can result when new virus particles are assembled. For example, if a cell is infected by both an avian and a human influenza virus, the new viruses budding from that cell might contain some segments from the avian influenza virus and others from the human influenza virus. An AI virus that contained some genes from a human influenza virus could establish itself in humans. Sometimes, an influenza virus can jump "whole" from one species to another. For instance, AI viruses have been known to jump from birds into people, cats, mink, seals, horses, and other animals. Usually, the virus is poorly adapted to the new species, cannot be transmitted efficiently, and quickly dies out.

Secondly, a virus occasionally develops new mutations that help its replication and transmission into the new host species, and a "permanent jump" is made. Although cross-species transmission is rare, it may be followed by an epidemic or pandemic, because the new host has no immunity to the new virus. For an epidemic to occur, three requirements must be met:

  1. A new influenza virus subtype must emerge in a species with little or no immunity to that subtype.
  2. The virus must produce disease in that species.
  3. There must be sustainable transmission in the new species.

As of January 2009, the currently circulating avian H5N1 viruses have met the first two criteria in humans and cats, but efficient or sustainable transmission has not been reported in either species.

3.4.8.1 Defining Guidelines for Control Measures in Pets

To prevent the spread of a notifiable disease outside of a designated zone or a Control Zone, the CFIA may make recommendations to owners regarding domestic pets in zones or areas where they believe a risk may exist.

If an influenza virus, such as HPAI H5N1 Asian strain, occurs in Canada in any species (including humans), there will be a high level of public awareness. In addition, there is relatively little substantive science and experience with this kind of virus in non-avian species. Therefore, it seems inappropriate at this time to recommend specific policy measures. Rather, an evaluation of the situation should take place at the time of the event. Appropriate actions may then be taken as needed.

Policy considerations for non-avian species depend on a number of factors:

  • the manner in which the virus entered the country – for instance, migratory birds, trade in domestic birds or products, smuggling;
  • the species affected – domestic poultry versus wild birds or other species;
  • the number of animals and/or flocks affected or the number of locations where wild birds are involved, indicating the amount of virus in the affected area(s);
  • the extent of the geographic distribution of an outbreak; and
  • any new science concerning the influenza viruses in non-avian species.

The mandate of the CFIA and its legislative base determines the formal policies that are enacted at the time of an outbreak with an influenza virus, such as HPAI H5N1 Asian strain. However, based on the factors above, the general recommendations for consideration at the time of the event and in the appropriate zone or area, depending on the initial detection (i.e. wild bird or domestic population), will be as follows:

  • a hunting ban, within appropriate geographic limits (an area which could be defined by an appropriate Canadian wildlife management service and cover the distribution area of the wild bird species found affected, as well as its migration status at the time of the detection);
  • recommendation or notification to hunters to refrain from using their retrieving dogs in the area of an influenza virus outbreak, such as HPAI H5N1 Asian strain;
  • notification to keep cats indoors;
  • notification to keep dogs on a leash;
  • control on movement of pets out of the specified zone or Control Zones, except under the following special situations:
    • visits to a veterinarian if the animal is ill, or
    • under compliance with a specific checklist that might include keeping the animal indoors at all times, or providing a veterinarian health certificate; and
  • no movement of non-avian animals off a declared infected premises without a permit.

3.4.8.2 Control Measures for the Swine Population

Influenza virus infections are a common occurrence in swine worldwide, including within the North American swine population, and have been demonstrated to occur on a year-round basis. A synergistic factor in the porcine respiratory disease complex (PRDC), swine influenza virus (SIV) is an important cause of broncho-interstitial pneumonia and respiratory disease in pigs. Influenza virus is a zoonotic disease of concern on a global scale, presenting economic and health challenges to both human and animal populations. Although human H3N2 viruses have been isolated from pigs in Asia and Europe, historically, there has been varied evidence of human H1N1 influenza viruses maintaining themselves in swine populations. SIV infections, both H3N2 and H1N1, have been reported in humans in Canada, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Humans occupationally exposed to pigs are at increased risk for seroconversion and for influenza-like illness (ILI), attributable to SIV. The reported number of SIV infections in humans, however, is negligible, compared with the number of people exposed to pigs occupationally or by proximity. The true incidence and significance of zoonotic SIV infection is unknown, which may be due in part to inconsistent diagnostic confirmation and reporting within and between jurisdictions.

The CFIA, in collaboration with stakeholders, trading partners, and the public and animal health communities, has refined its approach to managing cases of the pandemic H1N1 2009 virus in swine.

This approach is consistent with the recommendations of the OIE, and is based on research and observations made since the virus was first detected in swine, indicating the following:

  • there is no food safety risk associated with the virus;
  • there is no evidence at this time that animals are playing a significant role in the spread of the virus in the general human population; and
  • the behaviour of this virus in pigs does not differ from other influenza viruses commonly detected in swine herds.

In light of these conclusions, the CFIA will not quarantine herds. Affected animals will be managed using the same veterinary management and biosecurity practices employed for other swine influenza viruses. This includes limiting opportunities for the virus to spread to other susceptible animals. Canada's slaughter system contains multiple inspection points to ensure that only healthy animals enter the food supply.

All herds in which the virus is detected will be monitored by their private veterinarians to verify that infected animals recover. Producers are encouraged to reinforce biosecurity measures at their facilities.

This approach is supported by provincial and territorial authorities and the Public Health Agency of Canada.

3.5 Actions in the Vicinity of an Infected Place

Prior to the Ministerial Declaration made under section 27 of the Health of Animals Act to define a PCZ, a general provision exists under section 23 of the Act to individually declare Infected Place (quarantine) on all premises with poultry within 5 km of the limits of a premises where the disease has been suspected, presumed, or confirmed. For NAI, the size of this area under section 23 of the Act would be from 1 km to 3 km, and it would be referred to as the Infected Zone. This Infected Place declaration is an interim measure until the PCZ is enacted and movement control zones are defined, if required. It is anticipated that as soon as the virus is determined to be H5N1 Asian strain or to be highly pathogenic by NCFAD, the Ministerial Declaration will be made to define a PCZ.

Upon the declaration of NAI infection, the CFIA will put together an exemption team. This team will comprise local and national experts who will evaluate exemption requests. Various parameters, such as the species, breed, genetic value, and other criteria, will be assessed to provide exclusion from an order of destruction if the bird or group of birds is deemed to be of sufficient value. These decisions require support from CFIA's legal services.

3.5.1 Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza

Premises where HPNAI is detected will be declared an Infected Place, and the poultry and poultry products will be ordered destroyed. The radius of the Infected Zone is 3 km.

3.5.1.1 HPNAI in Commercial Poultry

For any HPNAI (including H5N1 Asian strain) detected in commercial poultry, the CFIA systematically establishes an Infected Zone, and acts as follows.

Infected Zone
  1. Undertakes pre-emptive depopulation through destruction of all commercial poultry flocks within a 1-km radius of the index premises, based on the situational assessment (using Form CFIA/ACIA 1612 – Declaration of Infected Place and Award of Compensation for these premises):
    • prioritizes the depopulation of premises that have significant epidemiological contact with known Infected Premises;
    • begins depopulation at the premises located at the periphery of the Infected Zone, moving toward the centre, and then to similar production-type premises; and
    • collects samples for virology and serology at the time of destruction.
  2. Provides a Declaration of Infected Place on the following:
    • all commercial poultry premises located in the Infected Zone (using Form CFIA/ACIA 4204 – Declaration of an Infected Place for these premises); and
    • significant contact premises, including non-commercial, with the priority for declaration based on proximity and production type (similar production types being declared first).
  3. Identifies non-commercial poultry premises located in the Infected Zone. Declares as Infected Places, if required, based on these risk factors:
    • proximity to a known infected premises;
    • density of poultry population; and
    • any other relevant epidemiological information.
  4. Conducts surveillance in commercial Galliformes and Anseriformes as follows:
    • baseline surveillance;
    • dead bird surveillance twice a week for three weeks;
    • weekly status report of flocks located on premises that were declared Infected Places; and
    • pre-movement surveillance.
  5. Lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the disposal of birds on the known infected premises.
Restricted Zone (a radius of 10 km from the infected premises)
  1. Identifies all commercial and non-commercial poultry premises;
  2. provides information to the owner on clinical signs of AI and the call-in numbers to report any sick birds (sick calls);
  3. conducts surveillance in commercial Galliformes and Anseriformes as follows:
    • dead bird surveillance once per week for three weeks; and
    • pre-movement surveillance; and
  4. lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the disposal of birds on the known infected premises.

3.5.1.2 HPNAI in Non-Commercial Poultry

For any HPNAI (including H5N1 Asian strain) detected in non-commercial poultry, the CFIA takes the following actions:

Infected Zone
  1. Bases depopulation of premises located in the Infected Zone on epidemiological information, proximity, and density of the poultry population in the vicinity of the non-commercial infected flock.
  2. Carries out pre-emptive depopulation of premises that have had significant epidemiological contact with known infected premises.
  3. Provides a Declaration of Infected Place on the following:
    • all commercial poultry premises located in the Infected Zone (using Form CFIA/ACIA 4204 for these premises); and
    • significant contact premises, including non-commercial, with priority for declaration based on proximity and production type (with similar production types being declared first).
  4. Identifies non-commercial poultry premises located in the Infected Zone. They would be declared Infected Places, if required, based on these risk factors:
    • proximity to a known infected premises;
    • density of poultry population; and
    • any other relevant epidemiological information.
  5. Conducts surveillance in commercial Galliformes and Anseriformes as follows:
    • baseline surveillance;
    • dead bird surveillance once a week for three weeks or twice a week if risk assessment warrants;
    • weekly status report of flocks on premises declared Infected Places; and
    • pre-movement surveillance.
  6. Lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the disposal of birds on the known infected premises.
Restricted Zone
  1. Identifies all commercial and non-commercial poultry premises;
  2. provides information to the owner on clinical signs of AI and the call-in numbers to report any sick birds (sick calls); and
  3. lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the destruction of birds on the known infected premises.

3.5.1.3 HPNAI in Wild Birds

Wild birds are natural reservoirs for AI viruses, and the majority of these viruses circulate in wild birds with little or no impact on their health. Some of these viruses, particularly H5 and H7 subtypes, represent a threat to domestic poultry, due to their potential to mutate into HP AI form when introduced into domestic poultry flocks.

To increase understanding of how AI behaves in wild bird populations and for the purposes of an early warning system, the CFIA collaborates in AI surveillance activities in wild birds. These surveillance activities are undertaken with a range of partners, such as the Canadian Cooperative Wildlife Health Centre (CCWHC), the Canadian Wildlife Service, and the provinces and territories.

When samples are submitted during the investigation of a large die-off of wild birds, or when there is clinical evidence of HPNAI in wild birds and the subsequent results confirming that HPNAI is present become available in timely manner, the CFIA notifies domestic poultry owners in the vicinity of the finding. The CFIA stresses the need for enhanced biosecurity measures, if these are not already in place. Specifically, the CFIA recommends that domestic flocks, as well as their food and water, be kept indoors.

For any HPNAI, including H5N1 Asian strain, the following actions will be taken.

Infected Zone

The CFIA establishes an Infected Zone with a radius of 3 km from the location of a HPNAI-positive wild bird detection and carries out the following activities:

  1. Provides a Declaration of Infected Place in poultry operations, commercial and non-commercial, based on risk assessment.
  2. Conducts surveillance for commercial operations of Galliformes and Anseriformes as follows:
    • dead bird surveillance once a week for three weeks;
    • sick bird investigation;
    • weekly status report of flocks located on premises declared Infected Places; and
    • pre-movement surveillance.
  3. Notes that surveillance for non-commercial operations of Galliformes includes only sick calls.
  4. Lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the detection of HPNAI virus in a wild bird.
Restricted Zone

With a radius of 10 km from the location of a HPNAI wild bird detection, the following surveillance activities take place:

  • For commercial operations of Galliformes and Anseriformes:
    • sick bird investigation; and
    • weekly status report of flocks located on premises declared Infected Places.
  • The response described above to the detection of HPNAI in a wild bird population may be modified according to the parameters that are available during the investigation:
    • the time from sample collection to the final test results;
    • the sample origin (die-off, dead bird or live healthy bird);
    • the wild bird species affected;
    • the distribution area of that species;
    • resident or migratory birds; and
    • the period of the year (e.g. migration, nesting, or wintering).

3.5.2 Low Pathogenicity Notifiable Avian Influenza

Premises where LPNAI is detected will be declared an Infected Place, and the poultry ordered destroyed. Poultry products from infected premises are ordered destroyed if they pose a risk of spreading the virus. If created, the size of the Infected Zone would be between a radius of 1 km and 3 km.

3.5.2.1 LPNAI in Commercial Poultry

For any LPNAI detected in commercial poultry, the CFIA systematically establishes an Infected Zone, and takes the following actions.

Infected Zone
  1. Provides a Declaration of Infected Place on the following:
    • all commercial poultry premises located in the Infected Zone (using Form CFIA/ACIA 4204 for these premises); and
    • significant contact premises, including non-commercial, priority for declaration being based on proximity and production type (with similar production types being declared first).
  2. Identifies non-commercial poultry premises located in the Infected Zone. Declares as Infected Places, if required, based on the following risk factors:
    • proximity to a known infected premises;
    • density of poultry population; and
    • any other relevant epidemiological information.
  3. Conducts surveillance in commercial Galliformes and Anseriformes as follows:
    • baseline surveillance;
    • dead bird surveillance once a week for three weeks – only for Galliformes);
    • sick bird investigation;
    • weekly status report of flocks on premises declared Infected Places; and
    • pre-movement surveillance.
  4. Lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the disposal of birds on the known infected premises.
Restricted Zone

A Restricted Zone will not be created, unless there is evidence that the outbreak is extensive. In this case, the actions in the Restricted Zone would be similar to those described for HPNAI in commercial poultry.

3.5.2.2 LPNAI in Non-Commercial Poultry

During a LPNAI outbreak, the CFIA does not establish an Infected Zone when the initial infected place is a non-commercial operation. However, the CFIA takes the following actions:

  1. identifies all commercial and non-commercial poultry premises located in a 3-km radius of an infected premises;
  2. provides the owner with information on clinical signs of AI and the call-in numbers to report any sick birds;
  3. bases other surveillance activities on proximity and density of poultry population in the area; and
  4. lifts the restriction on premises declared Infected Places, following quarantine release surveillance, with negative results 21 days after the disposal of birds on the known infected premises.

3.5.2.3 LPNAI in Wild Birds

The CFIA will not implement disease control activities following the detection of LPNAI in wild birds. General information will be provided to the public to maintain consumer confidence. The CFIA will reiterate to the commercial poultry industry, as well as to the non-commercial or hobbyist poultry owner, the importance of biosecurity.

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