Pathogen Safety Data Sheet - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

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SECTION I: DISEASE / INFECTIOUS AGENT

SYNONYM / CROSS REFERENCE:bird flu, fowl plague

ETIOLOGY / TAXONOMY ^(1,2):
Family: Orthomyxoviridae
Genus: Influenzavirus A, B
All highly pathogenic isolates have been Influenza A viruses of subtypes H5 & H7

ORGANISM CHARACTERISTICS:

• single stranded, negative sense RNA virus, segmented, enveloped, highly pleiomorphic.
• low pathogenic strains may change rapidly through antigenic shift or drift to become highly pathogenic ^{(1, 3, 4)}
• described by hemagglutination (H) and neuraminidase (N) antigens ⁽⁵⁾

SURVEILLANCE :

• HPAI is a reportable disease in Canada. Animal owners, veterinarians and laboratories are required to immediately report the presence of an animal that is contaminated or suspected of being contaminated to a CFIA district veterinarian. Control or eradication measures will be applied immediately (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/H-3.3/fulltoc.html).

DISTRIBUTION :

• worldwide
• low pathogenic strains may change rapidly through antigenic shift or drift to become highly pathogenic ^{(1, 3, 4)}

SECTION II: ANIMAL HEALTH HAZARD AND EPIDEMIOLOGY

CLINICAL DISEASE / PATHOGENESIS:
1) Clinical signs ^{(1, 2, 6, 7)}:

• can range from mild disease with little or no mortality to highly fatal rapidly spreading epidemic
• sudden decrease in egg production
• swollen and cyanotic wattles and combs
• depression
• coughing and sneezing
• seroconversion

2) Infectious dose: Unknown

3) Incubation period: short 3-5 days ^{(1, 2)}

SOURCE / MODE OF TRANSMISSION / COMMUNICABILITY:

• contact with wild birds (especially waterfowl) and their faeces ⁽¹⁾
• contact with infected poultry and poultry products, contaminated clothing, footwear, vehicles, equipment and feed ^{(1, 6)}

VECTORS: none

HOST RANGE :

• migratory waterfowl natural host range (especially ducks) ⁽⁸⁾
• all species of birds susceptible (including chickens, turkeys, pet birds and wild birds)⁽¹⁾
• humans
• other known species: cats, dogs, pigs

ZOONOSIS :

• HPAI virus can be transmitted to humans, however the transmission occurred in rare cases where people had prolonged contact with heavily contaminated environments ⁽⁶⁾.

RESERVOIR : generally waterfowl

Section III: DIAGNOSIS

NECROPSY / HISTOPATHOLOGY FINDINGS ^{(1, 2, 3)}:

• vascular disturbances leading to edema, hemorrhage especially in myocardium, spleen, lungs, brains and wattles
• necrotic foci present in lungs, liver and kidneys

LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS ⁽³⁾:

• haemagglutination
• immunofluorescence
• ELISA
• serotyping
• PCR
• gene sequencing

DRUG SUSCEPTIBILITY:

• for humans: Influenza A susceptible to amantadine and rimantadine (not licenced for use in food animals) ^{(4, 5)}.
• vaccination may be used to supplement control measures ⁽⁴⁾.

DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS:
The following diseases may show clinical similarity to HPAI.
Associated with high mortality:

• Newcastle disease
• Infectious laryngotracheitis
• Duck plague
• Acute poisoning

Associated with swelling of combs and wattles:

• Bacterial cellulitis of combs and wattles
• Acute fowl cholera

SECTION IV: DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES

Select a registered disinfectant with a drug identification number (DIN). Use according to label directions for concentration and contact time. Consider organic load and temperature. It is recommended that laboratories evaluate the effectiveness of the disinfectant using a validated method (e.g. Quantitative Carrier Test). See table 1 to help select a registered disinfectant for use against HPAI virus.

PHYSICAL INACTIVATION: ⁽¹⁾

SURVIVAL OUTSIDE OF HOST:

• remains viable for long periods in tissues, feces and water (manure 105 days, dried mucous several hours) ^{(7, 5)}.

SECTION V: LABORATORY HAZARDS FOR HUMANS

LABORATORY ACQUIRED INFECTIONS:

• No documentation of laboratory acquired infections but there are informal accounts ⁽⁵⁾

BIOSAFETY PRECAUTIONS :

• Avoid any direct contact with virus, especially through feces ⁽³⁾.
• Limit the generation of aerosols ^{(5, 3)}.

SECTION VI: PHYSICAL AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS:
All physical containment and operational practices for containment level 3, indigenous agents, as per the Containment Standards for Veterinary Facilities must be met. The Standards can be accessed at : http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/lab/convet/
convete.shtml

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING:
Laboratory:

• Primary layer of protective clothing should include dedicated laboratory clothing (e.g. scrubs and headwear) and laboratory dedicated footwear.
• Secondary layer of protective clothing (e.g. solid-front gowns with tight-fitting wrists, 2 pairs of gloves) should be worn over laboratory clothing when directly handling infectious materials.
• Adequate respiratory protection should be worn when directly handling infectious material outside BSC.
• When full body protective clothing is not worn a shower is required on exit; where a known or suspected aerosol exposure has occurred a shower is required on exit.

Post Mortem:

• Primary layer of protective clothing should include dedicated laboratory clothing (e.g. scrubs and headwear) and laboratory dedicated footwear.
• Secondary layer of protective clothing (e.g. solid-front gowns with tight-fitting wrists, 2 pairs of gloves) should be worn over laboratory clothing when directly handling infectious materials.
• Cut resistant gloves, adequate respiratory protection, steel toed/steel shanked rubber boots.
• A shower is required on exit.

HANDLING INFORMATION :
Spills in laboratory:

Allow aerosols to settle; wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), gently cover spill with absorbent paper towel and apply 2% sodium hypochlorite, starting at perimeter and working towards the centre; allow 30 minutes contact time ⁽⁴⁾.

Spill protocol must be in place and include the following scenarios:

• spills inside the Biological Safety Cabinet (BSC)
• spills outside the BSC
• spills while performing aerosol generating procedures
• also consider entry and exit procedure modifications if necessary, appropriate PPE, disinfection of spill and surroundings including contact time, flow (pattern) of the clean up and disposal of contaminated materials.

Refer to Table 1 for inactivation of HPAI.

STORAGE: All cultures and infected material should be stored in leakproof, sealed containers that are accurately labeled and clearly identified as a biohazard risk. The access to infectious material should be controlled at all times. Records must be kept to describe the use, inventory and disposal of infectious material.

DISPOSAL: Decontaminate all infectious material prior to disposal. Use steam sterilization, incineration or chemical disinfection.

REFERENCES:

1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza technical card, Office International des Epizooties updated 22-04-2002, http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A150.htm
2. AusVetPlan, Edition 2.0, 1996: http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/shadomx/apps/fms/
   fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=D4552211-C369-9A31-F51B-
   3DB61D0CCB39&siteName=aahc
3. Avian Influenza animal health disease card, Food Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/
   avian.html
4. Zoonoses and Communicable Diseases Common to Man and Animals, Second Edition, PAHO publication # 503
5. Influenza virus MSDS, Public Health Agency of Canada, May 2000, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/msds-ftss/msds88e.html
6. Avian Influenza fact sheet, Animal Health CFIA, April 2003, http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemalae.shtml
7. Avian Influenza fact sheet, UC Davis Veterinary Medicine, http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/vetext/INF-PO_AvianInfluenzaFS.html
8. Avian Influenza fact sheet WHO, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/avian_faqs/
   en/index.html
9. Prince H, Prince D, Principles of Viral Control and Transmission. In: Block SS, ed. Disinfection, Sterilization and Preservation, Fifth Edition, 2001:543-571

LAST UPDATED (DATE): March 30th, 2005
PREPARED BY: The Biohazard Containment and Safety Unit, CFIA

Disclaimer: Although the information and recommendations in this Pathogen Safety Data Sheet are compiled from reliable sources, there is no guarantee, warranty or any assurance that the information and recommendations are correct, accurate, sufficient, reliable or current and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency shall not be responsible for any loss or damage resulting from or in connection with the use of or reliance upon the information and recommendations.

The user assumes all risks and responsibility for and shall be liable for the use of and any reliance on the information and recommendations and the results thereof and any loss or damage resulting therefrom.

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